Network connectivity plays an important role in the information exchange between different agents in the multi-level networks. In this paper, we establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of the decision-making at different layers of the multi-level networks. Specifically, we design a decentralized algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network iteratively. In addition, we show that the designed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium asymptotically and yields an equilibrium network. To study the network resiliency, we introduce three adversarial attack models and characterize their worst-case impacts on the network performance. Case studies based on a two-layer mobile robotic network are used to corroborate the effectiveness and resiliency of the proposed algorithm and show the interdependency between different layers of the network during the recovery processes.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the challenges in mobile robotic network (MRN) is to maintain the connectivity between robots, since a higher connectivity enables faster information spreading and hence a high level of situational awareness. Connectivity control of the MRN has been addressed in a number of previous works including [1] - [3] which have successfully tackled a single network of cooperative robots. Recent advances in networked systems have witnessed emerging applications involving multilayer networks or network-of-networks [4] . For example, when unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) execute tasks together, the whole network can be seen as a two-layer interdependent network as shown in Fig. 1 . The current single network control paradigm is not sufficient yet to address new challenges related to the analysis and design of multi-layer mobile networks.
The main objective of this work is to develop a theoretic framework that can capture the interactions between robots within a network and across networks. In our problem setting, each layer of the robotic network aims to maximize the connectivity of the overall network. If the whole network is fully cooperative or governed by a single agent, then the designed network is a team-optimal solution. However, in practice, different layers of robotic networks are often operated by different entities, which makes the coordination between separate entities difficult. To address this problem, we establish a game-theoretic model in which two players control robots to maximize the global connectivity independently. This framework captures the lack of coordination between players in the multi-level networks. Furthermore, it guides the algorithmic G1 G2 Fig. 1 . Two-layer mobile robotic networks. One network consists of 5 UAVs, and the other network consists of 6 UGVs. design of decentralized mechanism for achieving an equilibrium solution that is close to the team-optimal solution. In this paper, two players update their own robotic configuration based on the current one to maximize the network connectivity. This generates an iterative algorithm which converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) point asymptotically.
An MRN is prone to adversarial attacks since a robot can be controlled by an adversary [5] , and the communication links between robots can be jammed [6] - [8] . To this end, we model the mobility of the robots by taking into account the communication links within and across the networks and use a gametheoretic approach to develop a resilient and decentralized algorithm for the individual network. To study the network resiliency, we consider three attack models including the global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attack, targeted jamming attack and denial-of-service (DoS) attack. We characterize the worst-case of each attack and identify the interdependencies that exist in the multi-level networks. Case studies show that the robot removal resulting from the DoS attack will lead to the largest decrease in the network connectivity, and the MRN is the most resilient to the GPS spoofing attack by using the proposed control method. Furthermore, robots in the network without attacks will respond by moving to the positions that can set up the most communication links with the robots in the attacked network during the recovery processes.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) We establish a game-theoretic framework that enables a decentralized control of multi-level mobile robots. 2) We introduce three attack models to the network and characterize their worst-case scenarios. In addition, we design a resilient and decentralized algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global MRN. 3) We show the convergence of the designed algorithm to a NE asymptotically, and corroborate its effectiveness and resiliency by case studies. The existence of interdepen-dency in the multi-level MRN is also verified. In the previous works, robotic network connectivity control problem is often addressed either in a totally centralized way [1] , [2] , [9] , or completely decentralized way [10] . Our framework stands in between these two frameworks and thus leads to balanced features in terms of resiliency and optimality. The static interdependent network formation has been studied in [11] . We extend the model to mobile robotic networks.
II. BACKGROUND AND INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS
Let G(V, E) be an undirected graph composed by a set V of n nodes and a set E of m links with n = |V |, and m = |E|. For a link e ∈ E connecting nodes i and j where the link weight is equal to w ij , we define two vectors a e ∈ R n and b e ∈ R n , where a e (i) = 1, a e (j) = −1, b e (i) = w ij , b e (j) = −w ij , and other entries 0. Then, the Laplacian matrix L of network G can be expressed as
Basically, for the weighted Laplacian matrix L, its diagonal entries are equal to L ii = j∈Ni w ij , ∀i ∈ V , where N i denotes the set of nodes that are connected to node i. In addition, L ij = −w ij if nodes i and j are connected, for i = j ∈ V , and 0 otherwise. Note that w ij = w ji , ∀i, j ∈ V . By ordering the eigenvalues of L in an increase way, we obtain
where λ 2 (L) is called algebraic connectivity of G. In addition, the Fiedler vector of a network refers to the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue λ 2 (L) [12] . For a two-layer interdependent network, we define two networks G 1 (V 1 , E 1 ) and G 2 (V 2 , E 2 ), where network 1 and network 2 are represented by G i , for i = 1, 2, respectively. Network i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is composed of n i = |V i | nodes and m i = |E i | links. The global network resulting from the connection of these two networks can be represented by
, where E 12 is a set of intralinks between G 1 and G 2 . For convenience, we denote the network consisting of the intra-links between G 1 and G 2 as G 12 . The adjacency matrix A of the global network G has the entry a ij = w ij if nodes i and j are connected, and a ij = 0 otherwise. Let A 1 ∈ R n1×n1 and A 2 ∈ R n2×n2 be the adjacency matrices of G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and n = n 1 + n 2 . When E 12 = ∅, the adjacency matrix A ∈ R n×n takes the
a matrix used to capture the effect of intra-links between networks. Define two diagonal matrices D 1 ∈ R n1×n1 and
Then, by using L = D − A, we obtain the Laplacian matrix
where L 1 and L 2 are the Laplacians corresponding to A 1 and A 2 , respectively.
Remark 1: The above formulated two-layer interdependent framework can be easily extended to multi-layer cases.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate a two-level mobile robotic network formation problem using a game-theoretic framework.
A. Two-level Network Formation Game
The position of robots in the network is denoted by a vector x(t) = x 1 (t), x 2 (t), ..., x n (t) ∈ R 3×n , and the dynamic of each robot i is given byẋ i (t) = u i (t), where u i (t) ∈ R 3 is the control of robot i at time t. Besides, robots in the network can exchange data via wireless communications. Denote the communication link between robots i and j as (i, j). Then, the strength of the link (i, j) can be captured by the weight of the link. Thus, we can assign a weight function w :
The strength of a communication link decays exponentially with the distance [13] . Therefore, the entries A ij of the adjacency matrix A admit
for ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ R + , and ρ 1 < ρ 2 . When the distance between the robots is less than ρ 1 , the connectivity strength is up to 1; and when the distance is larger than ρ 2 , robots lose the connection. The model of a two-layer MRN is similar to the one in Fig. 1 . We label robots in G 1 as 1, 2, ..., n 1 ∈ V 1 , and robots in G 2 as n 1 + 1, n 1 + 2, ..., n 1 + n 2 ∈ V 2 . For simplicity, define −γ {1, 2} \ γ, where γ ∈ {1, 2}. We consider that two players, player 1 (P 1 ) and player 2 (P 2 ), play a network formation game. P 1 controls robots in network G 1 , and P 2 controls robots in G 2 . Specifically, P 1 and P 2 update their own mobile network iteratively by controlling the robots' positions which are denoted as x 1 and x 2 , respectively. Note that x 1 := (x 1 , ..., x n1 ) ∈ R 3×n1 , x 2 := (x n1+1 , ..., x n ) ∈ R 3×n2 , and x := (x 1 , x 2 ). For each update, P γ 's strategy is based on the current configuration of network G −γ . The objectives of players are aligned by maximizing the algebraic connectivity of the whole network G, λ 2 L G (x) , at every step. In addition, the action spaces of P 1 and P 2 are denoted by X 1 and X 2 , respectively, which include all the possible network configurations. The set of pure strategy profiles X := X 1 × X 2 is the Cartesian product of the individual pure strategy sets. Besides, the utility function for both players is
Remark 2: The objectives of two players can be different. However, in our problem setting, the two teams of robots execute tasks collaboratively, and thus they both aim to optimize the global network connectivity to improve communications.
One essential constraint is the minimum distance between the robots in the same layer. We assign a minimum distance for robots in G 1 and G 2 denoted by d 1 and d 2 , respectively, to avoid collision. Then, the network formation game can be represented by two individual interdependent optimization problems Q t 1 and Q t 2 as follows:
where V 1 and V 2 denote the sets of nodes in G 1 and G 2 , respectively, and τ 1 ∈ R + and τ 2 ∈ R + are the time constants indicating the update frequency of the players. Note that τ 1 and τ 2 can be different because of distinct sensing, detection, and response capabilities of two mobile networks. Smaller τ 1 and τ 2 indicate a higher resilience of the network to attacks, since a higher update frequency leads to a faster system recovery.
IV. SYSTEM DYNAMICS DISCRETIZATION AND EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION CONCEPT To address the MRN formation problem formulated in
Section III, we first analyze the fundamental network algebraic connectivity maximization problem (ACMP). For a given network G with n nodes, its algebraic connectivity is [12] 
where 1 is an n-dimensional vector with all-one entries. In addition, the function λ 2 (L G (x)) is concave in L G (x). Therefore, the ACMP max x λ 2 (L G (x)) gives rise to convex optimization approaches to deal with our MRN control problem. For the unconstrained ACMP, we present the following theorem.
). The network algebraic connectivity maxi-
where α ∈ R, and I n is an n-dimensional identity matrix.
A. Discretization of the Dynamics
For each update of the robotic network, it is essentially not continuous in time. Therefore, for simplicity, we discretize the formulated problems Q t 1 and Q t 2 in the following. First, we deal with the minimum distance constraint. By denoting Z ij (t) = ||x ij (t)|| 2 2 , and then differentiating ||x ij (t)|| 2 2 with respect to the time, we obtain 2{ẋ [2] . By using Euler's first order method
B. Problem Reformulation
Based on the discretized dynamics and for given initial position vectors x 2 (k) and x 1 (k) for P 1 and P 2 , we can reformulate the problems Q t 1 and Q t 2 as follows:
where α 1 (k + 1) and α 2 (k + 1) are the scalar objectives of Q k 1 and Q k 2 , respectively. The Laplacian matrix L G (k + 1) is obtained based on the discrete weight w ij , ∀i, j ∈ V .
C. Nash Equilibrium of the Game
Note that after P 1 takes his action at step k, G 1 and G 12 are reconfigured, where G 12 is the network between G 1 and G 2 . We denote network G 1 and G 12 at stage k as G 1,k and G 12,k , respectively. For simplicity, we further define G 12,k := G 1,k ∪ G 12,k , which is a shorthand notation for the merged network. Then, network G k can be expressed as G k = G 12,k ∪ G 2,k . Similarly, after P 2 updates network G 2 at step k, the whole network G k becomes G k = G 21,k ∪ G 1,k , where G 21,k := G 2,k ∪ G 12,k . Then, the formal definition of Nash equilibrium (NE) which depends on the position of robots is as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). The Nash equilibrium solution to the discretized multi-level MRN formation game is a strategy profile x * , where x * = (x * 1 , x * 2 ) ∈ X, that satisfy
, for ∀x 1 ∈ X 1 and ∀x 2 ∈ X 2 , where k denotes the time step, and x = (x 1 , x 2 ) is defined in Section III-A.
At the NE point, no player can individually increase the global network connectivity by reconfiguring their network.
V. SEMIDEFINITE PROGRAMMING AND ITERATIVE ALGORITHM
In this section, we first derive a semidefinite programming (SDP) approach to address the discretized optimization problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 , and then design an iterative algorithm to find the NE solution to the formulated MRN formation game.
A. Semidefinite Programming Formulation
Notice that in Q k 1 and Q k 2 , the minimum distance constraints ||x ij (k + 1)|| 2 2 ≥ d 1 , ∀i, j ∈ V 1 , and ||x ij (k + 1)|| 2 2 ≥ d 2 , ∀i, j ∈ V 2 , are nonconvex. To address this issue, one method is to regard the distance ||x ij (k+1)|| 2 2 = Z ij (k+1) as a new variable, and solve problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 with respect to unknowns Z ij (k + 1) and x(k + 1) jointly. In this way, Q k 1 and Q k 2 become convex problems. However, due to the coupling between the robots position and the distance vectors, solving Q k 1 and Q k 2 via merely adding new variables will yield inconsistency between the obtained solutions x(k + 1) and Z ij (k + 1), ∀i, j ∈ V . Therefore, further considerations are needed, and we first present the definition of Euclidean distance matrix as follows.
Definition 2 (Euclidean Distance Matrix). Given the positions of a set of n points denoted by N := {x 1 , ..., x n }, the Euclidean distance matrix representing the points spacing is defined as D :
A critical property of the Euclidean distance matrix is summarized in the following theorem. 
where C := I n − 1 n 11 T . Theorem 2 ensures the consistency between the robots position and distance vectors when they are treated independently. Specifically, denote Z = [Z ij ] i,j∈V , C = I n − 1 n 11 T , and we can further reformulate problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 as
Hence, Q k 1 and Q k 2 become convex and are semidefinite programming problems which can be solved efficiently.
B. Iterative Algorithm
In the network formation game, P 1 controls robots in G 1 and reconfigures the network by solving the optimization problem Q k 1 to obtain a new position of each robot. P 2 controls robots in network G 2 in a similar way by solving Q k 2 . Note that the players' action at the current step can be seen as a best-response to the network at the previous step. For given τ 1 and τ 2 in the continuous time space, we can obtain their update frequencies by normalizing them into integers denoted by s 1 and s 2 , respectively. Then, P 1 and P 2 reconfigure their robots for every s 1 and s 2 time intervals which can also be interpreted as the frequency of solving Q k 1 and Q k 2 , respectively. One approach to find the equilibrium solution is to address Q k 1 and Q k 2 iteratively until P 1 and P 2 cannot increase the network connectivity further through relocating their robots.
C. Feasibility and Convergence
Before solving the problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 , we should first analyze their feasibility, and we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given initial multi-level MRN where the distance between robots satisfies the constraint, then the game problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 are always feasible. Without loss of generality, we assume that two players will not update at the same step which can be easily achieved by normalizing the update frequency and choosing the initial update step of two players appropriately. Then, the convergence result is summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The iterative algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium point asymptotically.
Proof. Recall that both Q k 1 and Q k 2 maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network, and thus the resulting α i (k + 1), i ∈ {1, 2}, is no less than the one obtained from the previous update step. The algebraic connectivity of a network with n nodes is upper bounded by n − 1 [15] . Thus, from monotone convergence theorem [16] , the network connectivity sequence converges asymptotically. Denote the players' actions that achieve the network connectivity limit as x 1 andx 2 at some step l. Then, we obtain
Otherwise,x 1 andx 2 do not result in the network connectivity limit. Hence, the strategy pair (x 1 ,x 2 ) satisfies the NE Definition 1 which indicates that the proposed iterative algorithm converges to a NE point asymptotically.
Remark 3:
A typical example of the iterative algorithm is called alternating update in which P 1 and P 2 have the same update frequency and reconfigure the MRN sequentially.
VI. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN THE NETWORKS
Robots in the mobile networks are prone to malicious attacks [6] , [7] . Thus, their secure and resilient control is essential. In this section, we analyze the impact of three main types of adversarial attacks on the network performance.
A. GPS Spoofing Attack
Under the GPS spoofing attack, we consider the scenario that the physical movement of a robot is constrained, while it still maintains communications with other robots. The attack lasts for a period of g a in the discrete time measure, since the resource of an attacker is limited.
In the MRN, if robot i is compromised by the spoofing attacker at time step k 1 , then this scenario can be captured by adding constraints x i (k + 1) = x i (k), k = k 1 , ..., k 1 + g a − 1, to the problems Q k 1 and Q k 2 . To evaluate the impact of worstcase attack, we choose the robot that has the maximum degree denoted by i max , i.e., i max ∈ arg max i j∈Ni w ij , where N i is the set of nodes that are connected to node i.
B. Targeted Jamming Attack
The targeted jamming attack leads to link removal in the network [7] , [8] . To model this attack, denote the network as G(i, j) = (V, E \ (i, j)) after removing a link (i, j) ∈ E from network G, then, we have L = L − ∆L and ∆L = ∆D − ∆A, where ∆D and ∆A are the decreased degree and adjacency matrices, respectively. By using equation (1), we obtain ∆D and ∆A as follows:
where e i andẽ i,j are zero vectors except the i-th element equaling to 1 and w ij , respectively, and similar for e j and e j,i . Denote the Laplacian matrix of G(i, j) as L(i, j), and by using equations in (14) , we have
Similar to the GPS spoofing attack, the targeted jamming attack lasts for g b time steps. Then, we obtain w ij (k) = 0, k = k 2 , ..., k 2 + g b − 1, where (i, j) denotes the attacked link, and k 2 is the starting point of the attack. Attackers are often rational, i.e., they intentionally attack those communication links that whose removal will lead to the most decrease of the network connectivity. When link (i, j) is attacked, the resulting Laplacian is given by (15) . Denote the Fiedler vector of L as u, and thus u T Lu = λ 2 (L) based on the definition. By using (7) , we can obtain the following:
By removing the link (i, j) * ∈ arg max (i,j)∈E w ij (u i − u j ) 2 , the upper bound for λ 2 L(i, j) is the smallest, and the algebraic connectivity of G decreases the most.
C. Denial-of-Service Attack
The communication links in the MRN also face DoS attack [17] . The malicious attacker generates false message to flood the robots' communication resources which result in the node removal of the network. When a node i ∈ V is removed from the network G, then all links that are connected to node i should also be removed. Denote the Laplacian matrix of the network after the attack as L(i). Then, we obtain
If robot i is attacked at time k 3 , and the attack lasts for g c time steps, then, w ij (k) = 0, ∀j ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 , k = k 3 , ..., k 3 + g c − 1. The worst-case of DoS attack can be captured as follows. First, we have
Hence, by attacking robot i * ∈ arg max i j∈Ni w ij (u i − u j ) 2 , the algebraic connectivity of G encounters the most decrease.
VII. CASE STUDIES

A. Effectiveness of the Algorithm
In the case studies, both networks G 1 and G 2 include 6 mobile robots, and the minimum distance is set to 0.4. The link strength parameters of inter-links in two networks are the same, i.e., ρ 1 = 1, ρ 2 = 3 and α = 5, and for intralinks, the parameters are equal to ρ 1 = 1.5, ρ 2 = 5 and α = 4. P 1 and P 2 have the same update frequency and they reconfigure their robotic networks in an alternating fashion. In addition, YALMIP is adopted to solve the corresponding SDP problems [18] . The obtained results of the MRN configuration trajectory without attack and its corresponding network algebraic connectivity are shown in Fig. 2 . In specific, the MRN attains an equilibrium state after 10 updates which validates the effectiveness of the iterative algorithm.
B. Impact of Malicious Attacks
In this section, we quantify the impact of each worst-case attack introduced in Section VI. For clarity, we assume that each attack is launched at step 6 during the network formation game, and without loss of generality, all attacks last for two steps. The result of network algebraic connectivity under each attack condition is shown in Fig. 3(a) . We can see that the denial-of-service attack leads to the most decrease of the network connectivity comparing with other attacks, while the GPS spoofing attack is the least severe one.
C. Resiliency of the Network to Attacks
To quantify the resiliency of the MRN to attacks, we adopt a metric based on the system recovery speed and ability under the adversarial attacks. The adopted MRN model is the same as that in Section VII-A. In addition, the attacks are added to the MRN at step 10, and the attacker's action remains the same in the following steps. Fig. 3(b) shows the corresponding results. Specifically, the GPS spoofing attack does not impact the network performance in this case, since the attack is added at the point where MRN is at equilibrium, and the constrained physical movement of robots is not sufficient to decrease the network connectivity. For other cases, the MRN begins to recover after the attack happens which indicates the high-level situational awareness of the MRN. Moreover, besides the GPS spoofing attack, the MRN is the most resilient to the targeted jamming attack by using the designed iterative algorithm in terms of the agile recovery to a satisfying performance. The DoS attack can cause a huge loss of the algebraic connectivity, and the MRN cannot fully recover under this attack due to the removal of a robot. However, the rate of the network reaching a new NE is fast in this case.
D. Interdependency of Multi-level Robotic Networks
Comparing with single-level networks, a unique feature of the multi-level networks is their inherent interdependencies. We aim to show the existence of interdependency in the multilevel MRN in this section. Fig. 4 depicts the evolution of mobile network configuration corresponding to the DoS attack scenario in Section VII-C. After introducing the attack at time step 10, the robots will respond to it by moving to a new position which validates the resiliency of MRN. In addition, by comparing two robotic networks in Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 4 , we find that robots in the network without attack (upper level) will move toward a position that can allow to set up the most intra-links with robots in the attacked network (lower level), and this fact corroborates the natural interdependency between two networks. Due to the interdependency, the whole mobile network can be more resilient to malicious attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the connectivity control of multi-level mobile robotic networks. We have developed a decentralized resilient algorithm to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the network to adversarial attacks and shown its asymptotic convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Three types of attack models have been introduced, and their impacts have been quantified. Moreover, case studies have shown that the GPS spoofing attack has the least impact on the network performance, and the robotic network is the most resilient to the Fig. 4 . MRN configuration under the DoS attack. The attack is introduced at step 10 where the initial network formation game reaches an equilibrium. Both mobile networks will respond to the DoS attack in the following update steps until reaching another equilibrium. targeted jamming attack than other attacks by using the proposed control method. Future work can be designing a model predictive control algorithm that enables robots connectivityaware during the network formation game.
